Differences between Ward's dual-aspect idealism and your dual-aspect monism?

Recently I've been trying to delve into Keith Ward's new book 'More Than Matter: Is There More to Life Than Molecules?'

Like yourself and John, he rallies against the philosophies of materialism and reductionism.  However, he proposes the view of 'dual-aspect idealism', which I admit I'm somewhat confused by.  You yourselves advocate dual-aspect monism, and yet he seems to believe that your position is a variation of non-reductive physicalism, citing John's statement on structural reductionism as indicating the belief that everything that exists is part of the physical world.

He further claims that things like perceived sound are not "information" or "meaning" attached to particles (which I took as a reference to Questions of Truth) , but can only exist in consciousness. 

I wanted to ask for some clarification, as I get the sense Ward may have misrepresented your view.  What, if any, differences are there between Ward's dual-aspect idealism and your dual-aspect monism?  What of his claim of John's non-reductive physicalism?

Response: I haven't read Keith's book.  But we certainly don't think that "everything that exists is part of the physical world" (and I'd be amazed if Keith thinks we do)