Differences between Ward's dual-aspect idealism and your dual-aspect monism?

Recently I've been trying to delve into Keith Ward's new book 'More Than Matter: Is There More to Life Than Molecules?'

Like yourself and John, he rallies against the philosophies of materialism and reductionism.  However, he proposes the view of 'dual-aspect idealism', which I admit I'm somewhat confused by.  You yourselves advocate dual-aspect monism, and yet he seems to believe that your position is a variation of non-reductive physicalism, citing John's statement on structural reductionism as indicating the belief that everything that exists is part of the physical world.

He further claims that things like perceived sound are not "information" or "meaning" attached to particles (which I took as a reference to Questions of Truth) , but can only exist in consciousness. 

I wanted to ask for some clarification, as I get the sense Ward may have misrepresented your view.  What, if any, differences are there between Ward's dual-aspect idealism and your dual-aspect monism?  What of his claim of John's non-reductive physicalism?

Response: I haven't read Keith's book.  But we certainly don't think that "everything that exists is part of the physical world" (and I'd be amazed if Keith thinks we do)

Reductionist arguments and superstition

Thanks for answering my questions, they really helped me. I have two quick others if you're willing:

Would you say the secular definition of Christianity as "supernatural" or "superstitious" is inherently correct, outside of ritualistic Christians who just pray the prayers without believing in the metaphysics of it?

Do you think that the arguments put forward by physicalist-reductionists about the mind are held up by science?

Response: Belief in God is necessarily to belief in an entity beyond “nature” so to that extent it is “supernatural” although not “superstitious”. One thing that is completely clear from fundamental physics is that the universe is full of entities that are not those which common sense, or even “modern science” of 50 years ago, would have considered as the whole of “nature”.

If the mind were really only that which physicalist-reductionists say they believe it is hard to see how any arguments put forward by minds could be valid, let alone how emotions could be genuine. From my perspective these arguments are just extreme left-brain thinking which borders on the pathological. Plantinga is surely right to say that belief in God and belief in other minds depend on the same kind of reasoning, and it is no great surprise that many people who deny God also deny the existence of minds