Differences between Ward's dual-aspect idealism and your dual-aspect monism?

Recently I've been trying to delve into Keith Ward's new book 'More Than Matter: Is There More to Life Than Molecules?'

Like yourself and John, he rallies against the philosophies of materialism and reductionism.  However, he proposes the view of 'dual-aspect idealism', which I admit I'm somewhat confused by.  You yourselves advocate dual-aspect monism, and yet he seems to believe that your position is a variation of non-reductive physicalism, citing John's statement on structural reductionism as indicating the belief that everything that exists is part of the physical world.

He further claims that things like perceived sound are not "information" or "meaning" attached to particles (which I took as a reference to Questions of Truth) , but can only exist in consciousness. 

I wanted to ask for some clarification, as I get the sense Ward may have misrepresented your view.  What, if any, differences are there between Ward's dual-aspect idealism and your dual-aspect monism?  What of his claim of John's non-reductive physicalism?

Response: I haven't read Keith's book.  But we certainly don't think that "everything that exists is part of the physical world" (and I'd be amazed if Keith thinks we do)

How can we have a single continuous self if the soul is not immaterial?

I have heard that John rejects dualism, and that his answer to the question of an afterlife is the idea that God will remember our bodies and eventually reconstruct them. But how can those reconstructions be considered the same people as us? They would be made out of different atoms and would be more like an identical twin with our memories than ourselves! Furthermore, if the soul is not an immaterial thing, are we truly the people when we where born? For instance a man who was born 50 years ago would have few of the atoms that he was born with, but we still consider him the same person that was born 50 years ago. How can we have a single continuous self if the soul is not immaterial?

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John describes his view as “dual aspect monism” – we do not think that matter is the only thing that exists. The soul is something like a pattern of active information. Continuity as a person does not in this view depend on the continuity of atoms but of the pattern of active information. It’s a bit like how a violin sonata can remain the same when played on a different violin.