I have often wondered about evolutionary psychology and its implications for the existence of values endorsed by the Christian faith. My concern is that much of neuroscience and psychology have shown that values most likely don't exist, and are just evolutionary mechanisms that helped ancient humans survive.
Take beauty and love, for instance. Many studies over the past few years have indicated that the neurotransmitter dopamine is both implicated in perceptions of beauty/love and in learning/memorizing novel stimuli. One could conclude from such data that beauty and love are simply evolutionary mechanisms that prompt people to memorize and familiarize themselves with novel environments and situations. That's certainly the attitude taken by this New York Times article, here. The idea would explain the old aphorism 'variety is the spice of life', making sense of why we humans often find things "beautiful" (or just interesting at all, really) only when they seem original and unique, and we have such disdain for what we think are clichés. It would also explain the intuition that beauty and love are 'outside' of us - the intuition is essentially telling us that our current environment/stimuli (which IS technically outside of us) is unprecedented, and ought to be memorized and focused upon for survival purposes.
Is the above interpretation warranted by the data, or is there still reason to believe in values as immaterial entities? If it isn't a threat, then why would God create a world where we can grow 'numb' to things which are intrinsically lovely or beautiful once we are familiar with them? Furthermore, why would God make this numbing process evolutionarily beneficial? (it doesn't seem to be a result of the Fall, since the numbing mechanism probably evolved before humanity came around). Please reply as you are able.
Response: All our perceptions of anything are mediated by our brains and neuroscientists can paint a fascinating picture of the mechanisms involved. Since our brains, like the rest of our bodies, have evolved it is also possible to tell an evolutionary story “explaining” any aspect of brain behaviour. (These are known as “Evolutionary Just-so Stories” and are taken with a massive pinch of salt by experts – but they can be fun and sometime illuminating. Naïve journalists and their readers lap them up).
But this of course has nothing to do with whether the entities we think we perceive exist or not. Most people who say “values don’t exist” will certainly agree that the sun (say) exists. But neuroscience has a fascinating story of how we perceive the sun and the sun certainly impacts on our hormones and chemistry and there are obvious evolutionary advantages in being able to perceive the sun.
Whether you believe that the fundamental basis of the universe is a Loving Ultimate Creator or meaningless matter/energy is a philosophical decision and no conceivable scientific experiment could settle the question. It’s certainly a problem for atheists to account for the existence of objective moral truths – and they mostly seem to be committed to the conclusion that “torturing babies for fun is wrong” is simply a matter of opinion. But we cannot force them to accept the deep Love at the heart of the universe – we have to hope and pray that they see it.
Showing posts with label Neuroscience. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Neuroscience. Show all posts
Friday, 11 January 2013
Sunday, 11 November 2012
Objective beauty
I have written to you before on the subject of the relationship between personal experiences and brain activity (i.e. the question of whether love simply amounts to an increase in dopamine or oxytocin). I was hoping I might ask both you and Dr. Polkinghorne to elaborate on said relationship, given a different scenario.
Both of you have advocated for the idea that there exists objective beauty in the world, though our experiences of said beauty will not repeat themselves. However, how does one interpret euphoric reactions to drugs? Many purport to experience 'highs' of a sort in response to various drugs, ranging from illegal substances like cocaine to something as innocuous as an anti-depressant. Some even claim that drugs are the main instigators of religious experiences!! Given this reality, how can the existence of objective beauty be defended? I am not simply asking whether the experience is more complex than a simple drug reaction, but how beauty can exist outside of us if many so-called beautific experiences can be instigated by a simple pill.
There is also my concern with beauty in light of research on mirror-neurons. I've recently read studies, including one mentioned here, suggesting that many experiences of beauty (especially in music) are due to mirror neurons. They imply that, just as mirror neurons produce what we think are a person's genuine emotions when they are actually our subconscious reactions to their facial expressions, what we mistake for the 'meaning' in a piece of music is really just the 'feeling' of singing or playing the song ourselves. Does this finding threaten the idea of beauty as an immaterial aspect of reality?
Response: Certainly anything that we perceive or think has some implication in our brains. But the fact that a whole load of neurons are involved doesn’t mean that the underlying phenomena are not objective. It is not reasonable to (seriously) doubt the existence of the things we see, even though undoubtedly we perceive things with the optic nerve, the visual cortex (and numerous other systems). Similarly the fact that mirror neurons are involved in our perceptions of beauty (and many other things besides) doesn't imply at all that beauty doesn't exist.
Similarly the fact that we can sometimes be misled by our brains, or that our perceptions can be distorted by injury, chemicals or other interference with the 'proper function' of our nervous system doesn't mean that what we perceive is unreal.
The emerging understanding of mirror neurons is certainly fascinating (I very much enjoy VS Ramachandran's writing on this subject) but it's worth remembering that this field is still in its infancy and there is LOTS LOTS more to learn. In no way do they show that anything is "really just" anything.
What is pretty clear is that if you want to follow the "New Atheists" down their path then you have to abandon, not only God, but beauty, free will, love, meaning and much else besides. Including, of course, the idea that our brains are capable of finding truth - Plantinga's famous Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. It is a "path that leads to destruction" in more ways than one.
Both of you have advocated for the idea that there exists objective beauty in the world, though our experiences of said beauty will not repeat themselves. However, how does one interpret euphoric reactions to drugs? Many purport to experience 'highs' of a sort in response to various drugs, ranging from illegal substances like cocaine to something as innocuous as an anti-depressant. Some even claim that drugs are the main instigators of religious experiences!! Given this reality, how can the existence of objective beauty be defended? I am not simply asking whether the experience is more complex than a simple drug reaction, but how beauty can exist outside of us if many so-called beautific experiences can be instigated by a simple pill.
There is also my concern with beauty in light of research on mirror-neurons. I've recently read studies, including one mentioned here, suggesting that many experiences of beauty (especially in music) are due to mirror neurons. They imply that, just as mirror neurons produce what we think are a person's genuine emotions when they are actually our subconscious reactions to their facial expressions, what we mistake for the 'meaning' in a piece of music is really just the 'feeling' of singing or playing the song ourselves. Does this finding threaten the idea of beauty as an immaterial aspect of reality?
Response: Certainly anything that we perceive or think has some implication in our brains. But the fact that a whole load of neurons are involved doesn’t mean that the underlying phenomena are not objective. It is not reasonable to (seriously) doubt the existence of the things we see, even though undoubtedly we perceive things with the optic nerve, the visual cortex (and numerous other systems). Similarly the fact that mirror neurons are involved in our perceptions of beauty (and many other things besides) doesn't imply at all that beauty doesn't exist.
Similarly the fact that we can sometimes be misled by our brains, or that our perceptions can be distorted by injury, chemicals or other interference with the 'proper function' of our nervous system doesn't mean that what we perceive is unreal.
The emerging understanding of mirror neurons is certainly fascinating (I very much enjoy VS Ramachandran's writing on this subject) but it's worth remembering that this field is still in its infancy and there is LOTS LOTS more to learn. In no way do they show that anything is "really just" anything.
What is pretty clear is that if you want to follow the "New Atheists" down their path then you have to abandon, not only God, but beauty, free will, love, meaning and much else besides. Including, of course, the idea that our brains are capable of finding truth - Plantinga's famous Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism. It is a "path that leads to destruction" in more ways than one.
Sunday, 27 February 2011
Transhumanism and belief in God
Ever since I learned about the Blue Brain Project (a neural net simulation that has shown great promise - the scientist in charge is predicting an artificial brain in 10 years, though I think it'll take a bit longer than that), I've been thinking a great deal about what it means for man's future.
The simulation of the brain itself doesn't concern me much as a Christian, as I'm a monist already (thanks in no small part to the convincing arguments of you and Rev. Polkinghorne). However, the prospects for what it might mean for the rate of technological change does - particularly the idea of transhumanism.
My question is twofold - first, what do you think of transhumanism in general? Second, assuming a transhuman society is possible, is a belief in God still necessary in such a society? I believe the answer to the second question to be yes, for reasons I'll withhold for now, since I want to see what you think first. However, I'm not absolutely certain of my answer, and a second opinion would be quite helpful.
Since real brains are analog and Blue Brain is digital – and therefore much less subtle and powerful – I’m not worried about it as a threat to humanity at all. But it and similar projects (like SpiNNaker) will probably lead to much deeper scientific understandings, which is great.
I think “transhumanism” is over-hyped but with or without technical enhancements to humanity, the truth of God and God’s ultimate loving creation remain truths.
The simulation of the brain itself doesn't concern me much as a Christian, as I'm a monist already (thanks in no small part to the convincing arguments of you and Rev. Polkinghorne). However, the prospects for what it might mean for the rate of technological change does - particularly the idea of transhumanism.
My question is twofold - first, what do you think of transhumanism in general? Second, assuming a transhuman society is possible, is a belief in God still necessary in such a society? I believe the answer to the second question to be yes, for reasons I'll withhold for now, since I want to see what you think first. However, I'm not absolutely certain of my answer, and a second opinion would be quite helpful.
Since real brains are analog and Blue Brain is digital – and therefore much less subtle and powerful – I’m not worried about it as a threat to humanity at all. But it and similar projects (like SpiNNaker) will probably lead to much deeper scientific understandings, which is great.
I think “transhumanism” is over-hyped but with or without technical enhancements to humanity, the truth of God and God’s ultimate loving creation remain truths.
Is our idea of an "I" illusory?
I am a philosophy student with an interest in the debate between religion and science. I am a big fan of Professor Polkinghorne's books and would like to ask him a question.
I recently read a book called Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction by Dr. Susan J. Blackmore. The book suggests that our sense of a single "self" "I" or "soul" is illusory and that our current knowledge suggests that the feeling of a stream of consciousness, selfhood and free will are illusions resulting from the processes of the brain. The book advocates not thinking too much(and claims that our thoughts are mostly "Daft and Pointless" anyway) and learn to enjoy the lives we have no control over. As a Christian I find that this idea conflicts with my beliefs but I do not know enough about science to judge its validity. Is our idea of an "I" illusory?
To have an illusion presumably means that somebody believes something that is untrue. It is therefore hard to see in what sense the idea of a self really could be entirely an illusion. It’s a bit like saying the idea that we have a body is an illusion because in fact we have arms, legs, internal organs etc...
Blackmore is over-influenced by Dawkins and Dennett.
I recently read a book called Consciousness: A Very Short Introduction by Dr. Susan J. Blackmore. The book suggests that our sense of a single "self" "I" or "soul" is illusory and that our current knowledge suggests that the feeling of a stream of consciousness, selfhood and free will are illusions resulting from the processes of the brain. The book advocates not thinking too much(and claims that our thoughts are mostly "Daft and Pointless" anyway) and learn to enjoy the lives we have no control over. As a Christian I find that this idea conflicts with my beliefs but I do not know enough about science to judge its validity. Is our idea of an "I" illusory?
To have an illusion presumably means that somebody believes something that is untrue. It is therefore hard to see in what sense the idea of a self really could be entirely an illusion. It’s a bit like saying the idea that we have a body is an illusion because in fact we have arms, legs, internal organs etc...
Blackmore is over-influenced by Dawkins and Dennett.
Do we have personal continuity? and if not, how can we have souls?
The objections to our idea of a self (to repeat wikipedia) is that: that the intuitive concept of self is an evolutionary artifact. In the monkey-riding-a-tiger model of consciousness the brain models its own unconscious processes just as it models other people. This modeling makes the assumption that the model will continue to apply through time, and so assumes they are the same person they were yesterday. This leads to the intuitive sense of self. The sense of ‘self’ has also become part of our language, part of our concept of responsibility, and the basis of self based morality.
According to this line of criticism, the sense of self is an evolutionary artifact, which saves time in the circumstances it evolved for. But sense of self breaks down when considering some rare events such as memory loss, split personality disorder, brain damage, brainwashing, and various thought experiments. When presented with these imperfections in the intuitive sense of self and the consequences to this important concept which rely partly on the strict concept of self, people tend to try to mend the concept, possibly because of cognitive dissonance. Critics of personal continuity believe that this leads to extending the concept of self beyond its practical application and justification.
It is logically impossible to have the illusion that you have a mind: because an illusion is a false belief held to be true and only entities with minds can hold beliefs.
No doubt all our ideas are to some extent products of evolution: neuroscience itself is. This has nothing much to do with whether it is true.
The soul is the essence of who we are – not a separate physical object.
I was playing Beethoven’s 10 Violin Sonata (with Ruth Palmer) on my 55th birthday. As it happens her Strad is older than the Sonata, my piano much younger. But it is the same sonata as the one Beethoven wrote. If we were playing it on the violin that was originally used, and from the original MS, it would be amazing, but it would still be the same sonata and would make (intrinsically) no difference to the music. Indeed it could be that my piano and her violin are far better instruments than the ones on which the sonata was originally performed. That is a bit like the Resurrection: our music on better instruments with strings that don’t break or go out of tune.
Or in the immortal words of John Donne: “when one man dies, one chapter is not torn out of the book, but translated into a better language; and every chapter must be so translated”
According to this line of criticism, the sense of self is an evolutionary artifact, which saves time in the circumstances it evolved for. But sense of self breaks down when considering some rare events such as memory loss, split personality disorder, brain damage, brainwashing, and various thought experiments. When presented with these imperfections in the intuitive sense of self and the consequences to this important concept which rely partly on the strict concept of self, people tend to try to mend the concept, possibly because of cognitive dissonance. Critics of personal continuity believe that this leads to extending the concept of self beyond its practical application and justification.
It is logically impossible to have the illusion that you have a mind: because an illusion is a false belief held to be true and only entities with minds can hold beliefs.
No doubt all our ideas are to some extent products of evolution: neuroscience itself is. This has nothing much to do with whether it is true.
The soul is the essence of who we are – not a separate physical object.
I was playing Beethoven’s 10 Violin Sonata (with Ruth Palmer) on my 55th birthday. As it happens her Strad is older than the Sonata, my piano much younger. But it is the same sonata as the one Beethoven wrote. If we were playing it on the violin that was originally used, and from the original MS, it would be amazing, but it would still be the same sonata and would make (intrinsically) no difference to the music. Indeed it could be that my piano and her violin are far better instruments than the ones on which the sonata was originally performed. That is a bit like the Resurrection: our music on better instruments with strings that don’t break or go out of tune.
Or in the immortal words of John Donne: “when one man dies, one chapter is not torn out of the book, but translated into a better language; and every chapter must be so translated”
Daniel Wegner's claims to have disproved dualism and free will?
What do you think of Harvard Psycology professor Daniel Wegner's claims to have disproved dualism and free will?
In short, confused nonsense. You might as well claim show that music is an illusion because if you drill a hole in a violin it makes a different sound.
With the extra confusion that you cannot have an illusion unless you have a will to be deluded.
But this sort of thing sells books and certain people (who seem to think they lack free will) lap it up.
In short, confused nonsense. You might as well claim show that music is an illusion because if you drill a hole in a violin it makes a different sound.
With the extra confusion that you cannot have an illusion unless you have a will to be deluded.
But this sort of thing sells books and certain people (who seem to think they lack free will) lap it up.
Are selves a delusion?
Recent findings seem to suggest that we have no "self", but phenomenal self models,as argued in this book. How can we have souls if this is true?
This is a bit like saying that we do not have bodies because we have arms and legs, or that a string quartet does not exist because there are 2 violins, a viola and a cello.
You “soul” is the essence of who you are. If it turned out that this essence were in some sense essentially composed of many modules this is not a problem.
However the idea that the self is a delusion raises the question of what/who is being deluded, so it rests on very weak philosophical foundations.
Scientifically it may well be that our idea of our selves is composed through a number of complex and disparate mechanisms, indeed it is hard to see how it could be otherwise. But philosophically it makes no sense at all to describe this as an illusion:
a. The conclusion “the self is an illusion” cannot possibly follow from an observation like “the self arises through the interaction of a number of complex and disparate mechanisms”. With the possible exception of elementary particles, everything arises through such interactions. Metzinger might as well say “the body is an illusion” or “the brain is an illusion”.
b. To have an illusion presupposes that there is a conscious self which holds the false belief. If there were no conscious selves there could be no illusions.
Each of these objections is in my view catastrophic for Metzinger’s philosophical position.
This is a bit like saying that we do not have bodies because we have arms and legs, or that a string quartet does not exist because there are 2 violins, a viola and a cello.
You “soul” is the essence of who you are. If it turned out that this essence were in some sense essentially composed of many modules this is not a problem.
However the idea that the self is a delusion raises the question of what/who is being deluded, so it rests on very weak philosophical foundations.
Scientifically it may well be that our idea of our selves is composed through a number of complex and disparate mechanisms, indeed it is hard to see how it could be otherwise. But philosophically it makes no sense at all to describe this as an illusion:
a. The conclusion “the self is an illusion” cannot possibly follow from an observation like “the self arises through the interaction of a number of complex and disparate mechanisms”. With the possible exception of elementary particles, everything arises through such interactions. Metzinger might as well say “the body is an illusion” or “the brain is an illusion”.
b. To have an illusion presupposes that there is a conscious self which holds the false belief. If there were no conscious selves there could be no illusions.
Each of these objections is in my view catastrophic for Metzinger’s philosophical position.
Is the soul/self an illusion?
I am a Christian with an interest in the science of the brain. One of the most frighening idea's I've come across is that the soul might be an illusion. To make matters worse it's a source of inefficieny in the human organism. To quote from a recent paper I found on the subject:
"At least under routine conditions, consciousness does little beyond taking memos from the vastly richer subconcious environment, rubber-stamping them, and taking the credit for itself. In fact, the nonconscious mind usually works so well on its own that it actually employs a gatekeeper in the anterious cingulate cortex to do nothing but prevent the conscious self from interfering in daily operations.
...Compared to nonconscious processing, self-awareness is slow and expensive. (The premise of a separate, faster entity lurking at the base of our brains to take over in emergencies is based on studies by, among others, Joe LeDoux of New York University. By way of comparison, consider the complex, lightning-fast calculations of savantes; those abilities are noncognitive, and there is evidence that they owe their superfunctionality not to any overarching integration of mental processes but due to relative neurological fragmentation. Even if sentient and nonsentient processes were equally efficient, the conscious awareness of visceral stimuli—by its very nature— distracts the individual from other threats and opportunities in its environment. The cost of high intelligence has even been demonstrated by experiments in which smart fruit flies lose out to dumb ones when competing for food possibly because the metabolic demands of learning and memory leave less energy for foraging."
It seems that some for of consciousness is necessary for art, but that's basically just the brains way of hacking itself to release pleasurable chemicals. It's unneeded and ultimately a waste.
Is this true? Is the self an unneeded illusion?
Doubtless we all have illusions about ourselves, but the self cannot be an illusion. To have an illusion presupposes that there is a conscious self which holds the false belief. If there were no conscious selves there could be no illusions.
It is not surprising that self-awareness is “costly” in biological terms. And it is limited. But it is simply ridiculous to say that it is non-existent.
"At least under routine conditions, consciousness does little beyond taking memos from the vastly richer subconcious environment, rubber-stamping them, and taking the credit for itself. In fact, the nonconscious mind usually works so well on its own that it actually employs a gatekeeper in the anterious cingulate cortex to do nothing but prevent the conscious self from interfering in daily operations.
...Compared to nonconscious processing, self-awareness is slow and expensive. (The premise of a separate, faster entity lurking at the base of our brains to take over in emergencies is based on studies by, among others, Joe LeDoux of New York University. By way of comparison, consider the complex, lightning-fast calculations of savantes; those abilities are noncognitive, and there is evidence that they owe their superfunctionality not to any overarching integration of mental processes but due to relative neurological fragmentation. Even if sentient and nonsentient processes were equally efficient, the conscious awareness of visceral stimuli—by its very nature— distracts the individual from other threats and opportunities in its environment. The cost of high intelligence has even been demonstrated by experiments in which smart fruit flies lose out to dumb ones when competing for food possibly because the metabolic demands of learning and memory leave less energy for foraging."
It seems that some for of consciousness is necessary for art, but that's basically just the brains way of hacking itself to release pleasurable chemicals. It's unneeded and ultimately a waste.
Is this true? Is the self an unneeded illusion?
Doubtless we all have illusions about ourselves, but the self cannot be an illusion. To have an illusion presupposes that there is a conscious self which holds the false belief. If there were no conscious selves there could be no illusions.
It is not surprising that self-awareness is “costly” in biological terms. And it is limited. But it is simply ridiculous to say that it is non-existent.
Do we have free will?
Some recent theories in Neuroscience (by Thomas Metzinger and Daniel Wegner) would seem to suggest that we do not have, selfs or free will in the sense that we think we do. In fact our brain models our bodies as it models the outside world, and we call this our self. We do not have free will:All our actions are begun long before we consciously decide to do them. Are these conclusions true?
No.
Might as well say that violins don’t play music because they have strings.
However it may well be true that "our actions are begun long before we consciously decide to do them" - there is no reason why our decisions should not originate in our unconscious (and esp in the right brain) with the possibility of a conscious over-ride.
Will neuroscience one day prove that human beings don't have the ability to do otherwise?
I recently picked up a book entitled 'My Brain Made Me Do It: The Rise of Neuroscience and the Threat to Moral Responsibility' that sought to defend free will and moral responsibility. Seeing as how I felt I was already well acquainted with the concepts of compatibilism, incompatibilism, determinism and so forth, I skipped towards the last few chapters. They were really well done.
However, later I realized that the author, Eliezer Sternberg, never actually spoke about alternative possibilities in the chapters I had read. I decided to read some of the earlier chapters, and I was met with the revelation that Sternberg feels only conscious control over one's own actions are required to have free will. So long as it is the conscious self that is in control, he says, and not the brain itself, then one has free will. He sees (mistakenly in my view) being able to do otherwise as part of the compatibilist view of things. However, from my experience, compatibilists see free will as simply being free from coercion, while it is incompatibilists (primarily libertarians) who defend being able to do otherwise. As I see it, under this view there is merely a switch from biological determinism to universal determinism; there is no refutation of determinism, just a switching of what kind it is that controls you. This mistake on Sternberg's part really disappointed me.
My question, therefore, is this: Will neuroscience one day prove that human beings don't have the ability to do otherwise?
No.
It's perfectly cleat scientifically that, if there are any non-deterministic systems in the universe, then the brain is one.
However, later I realized that the author, Eliezer Sternberg, never actually spoke about alternative possibilities in the chapters I had read. I decided to read some of the earlier chapters, and I was met with the revelation that Sternberg feels only conscious control over one's own actions are required to have free will. So long as it is the conscious self that is in control, he says, and not the brain itself, then one has free will. He sees (mistakenly in my view) being able to do otherwise as part of the compatibilist view of things. However, from my experience, compatibilists see free will as simply being free from coercion, while it is incompatibilists (primarily libertarians) who defend being able to do otherwise. As I see it, under this view there is merely a switch from biological determinism to universal determinism; there is no refutation of determinism, just a switching of what kind it is that controls you. This mistake on Sternberg's part really disappointed me.
My question, therefore, is this: Will neuroscience one day prove that human beings don't have the ability to do otherwise?
No.
It's perfectly cleat scientifically that, if there are any non-deterministic systems in the universe, then the brain is one.
Are emotion like Love only neurotranmitters in our brains
Recently, I attended a college lecture having to do with the neuroscience of sex and drugs. According to the lecturing professor, love and lust simply amount to the neurotransmitters oxytocin and dopamine, and are simply used for what he calls 'pair-bonding' between males and females. After the lecture, I asked him if he felt his statements were dehumanizing; he stated yes, he did, and that reductionism is a wonderful tool for helping us see the utter predictability of human behavior. Now, about a week later, I've found a new study suggesting that 'love at first sight' is purely neuroscientific, as the human brain is designed to form a base opinion of another person within a few minutes of meeting him or her. Now I don't know about others, but I find these claims to be unsettling; does this mean that my love for others (family, friends, etc.) and vice versa have no real significance, that they just happen because I suddenly experience an influx of oxytocin? I've read 'Questions of Truth' and really appreciated its critique of philosophies like reductionism and scientism, so I ask: how do you feel about those claims that emotions like love only amount to the neurotransmitters in our brains?
NB Response: There is no doubt that our bodies influence our minds and behaviours. But almost nothing about biology or neuroscience is simple, and anyone who tells you that X & Y "simply amount to the neurotransmitters A and B" is either joking, oversimplifying ridiculously, or doesn't know what (s)he is talking about.
All the studies of that kind ever show is that there is a statistical association between X and higher levels of A (etc...) and typically the correlations are quite modest (and the p-values are often not much less than 5%).
It is clearly useful, for both biological and other reasons, to form some kind of opinion about another person very quickly indeed (friend or foe for example) and certainly some aspects of human behaviour can be predicted with a high probability. But even if 99.9% of all human behaviour could be correctly predicted 99.9% of the time (which is nothing like the case) then you would have no way of knowing what individuals people would be doing in a few days.
Lust is certainly influenced by our bodies, but love is by definition an act of our minds, and these can never be predicted with certainty. Mutual love even less so!
NB Response: There is no doubt that our bodies influence our minds and behaviours. But almost nothing about biology or neuroscience is simple, and anyone who tells you that X & Y "simply amount to the neurotransmitters A and B" is either joking, oversimplifying ridiculously, or doesn't know what (s)he is talking about.
All the studies of that kind ever show is that there is a statistical association between X and higher levels of A (etc...) and typically the correlations are quite modest (and the p-values are often not much less than 5%).
It is clearly useful, for both biological and other reasons, to form some kind of opinion about another person very quickly indeed (friend or foe for example) and certainly some aspects of human behaviour can be predicted with a high probability. But even if 99.9% of all human behaviour could be correctly predicted 99.9% of the time (which is nothing like the case) then you would have no way of knowing what individuals people would be doing in a few days.
Lust is certainly influenced by our bodies, but love is by definition an act of our minds, and these can never be predicted with certainty. Mutual love even less so!
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